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Patent Ownership: An Employer's Rights To His
Employee's Invention
Eighty-four percent of American patents are awarded to em-
ployed inventors;' therefore, the employer-employee relationship is
critical to the modern American patent system. To encourage con-
tinued invention, the patent law must allow both the inventor and
the developer (his employer) to obtain adequate compensation.
Under the present United States patent system, the common law,
which can be contractually altered, determines whether an inventor
or his employer owns a patent.
Critics say the United States patent system discourages innova-
tion by allowing an employer to use an employee's invention without
adequately compensating the inventor.2 Supporters argue that the
employer has already compensated the inventor through his regular
salary, and that an employer deserves the patent because of the vast
amount of money spent researching and developing an otherwise
worthless invention.3
The most academically pure method for compensating each
contributor would be to determine the inventor's and the developer's
contribution and give each a pro-rata share of the invention's value.
This method, however, would be highly impractical because it re-
quires meticulous records of each participant's work and detailed
analysis of each invention's worth. The law must find a realistic but
fair method of dividing an invention's value between the inventor
and the developer. The patent law, therefore, needs a broad, clear
rule which will allow a fair division in most circumstances.
This note attempts to articulate that rule. Part I examines the
I Rights of the Employed Inventor: Hearings on H.. 4732 and HR. 6635 Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration ofjustice of the House Comm. on the Judiciay, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1982) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier). The Wall Street Journal reported
a slightly smaller percentage (seventy-five percent). Wall St. J., Sept. 9, 1982, at 1, col. 6.
The term "employed inventor" is not limited to persons specifically hired to invent; rather, it
includes any employee who creates an invention. See Neumeyer, Employee's Rights in Their
Inventions, 83 INT'L LAB. REV. 1, reprinted in 44 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 674 (1962).
2 Wall St. J., supra note 1. See also Orkin, The Legal Rights of the Employed Inventor: New
Approaches to Old Problems (pts. 1 &2), 56J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 648, 719, 727-36 (1974); Sutton &
Williams, EmployedInventors: The Casefor the Moss Bill, 8 U.S.F.L. RFv. 557, 558 (1974); Note,
Statutory Decreed Award for Employed Inventors: Will The Spur Advancements in the Useful Arts?,
15 IDEA 575, 576-77 (1971).
3 See Wall St. J., supra note 1.
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common law methods for distributing patent rights between an in-
ventor and his employer; Part II discusses the recently enacted and
proposed statutory modifications to those methods; and Part III pro-
poses an improved method for equitably distributing an invention's
value between the inventor and his employer.
I. The Present System
An employer's right to his employee's patent depends on the
parties' intent; an express or implied agreement determines who
owns the invention and who can use it. 4 In theory, an inventor re-
tains the title to his patented invention unless he voluntarily assigns
the patent to his employer;5 but, in practice, most employees have an
obligation to assign their patents to their employers. 6 This obligation
may arise from an implied agreement created when an employee is
hired to invent, 7 or from a fiduciary duty which particular employees
owe toa their employer.8 Even if an inventor retains the patent, his
employer may have a license to use the invention if the inventor used
the employer's time, facilities, or money to create the invention, or if
the employer promoted the invention while reasonably expecting a
royalty-free use.9 The parties can also follow the modern trend and
allocate patent rights through an express contract. 0
A. Employment Status
Employment alone does not require an inventor to assign a pat-
ent to his employer. 1 Absent a specific agreement, an employer's
rights (and the inventor's duties) arise from the inventor's employ-
ment status. 12 Although, arguably, federal common law may control
4 National Dev. Co. v. Gray, 316 Mass. 240, 246, 55 N.E.2d 783, 787 (1944); Kinkade v.
New York Shipbldg. Corp., 21 N.J. 362, 366-67, 122 A.2d 360, 363-64 (1956).
5 Marshall v. Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co., 175 F.2d 215, 217 (3d Cir. 1949); New Jersey
Zinc Co. v. Singmaster, 71 F.2d 277, 278 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 591 (1934); National
Dev. Co. v. Gray, 316 Mass. 240, 246, 55 N.E.2d 783, 787 (1944); A & C Eng'g Co. v. Ather-
holt, 355 Mich. 677, 685, 95 N.W.2d 871, 875, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 824 (1959).
6 See Sutton & Williams, supra note 2, at 561.
7 See notes 11-39 infia and accompanying text.
8 See notes 40-57 infia and accompanying text.
9 See notes 58-75 infia and accompanying text.
10 See notes 76-107 infra and accompanying text.
11 Banner Metals, Inc. v. Lockwood, 178 Cal. App. 2d 643, 654-55, 3 Cal. Rptr. 421, 431
(1960); Kinkade v. New York Shipbldg. Corp., 21 N.J. 362, 369, 122 A.2d 360, 363-64 (1956).
An inventor can enjoin his employer from using the employee's patented invention. McNa-
mara v. Powell, 256 A.D. 554, 11 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1939).
12 Aero Bolt & Screw Co. v. Iaia, 180 Cal. App. 2d 728, 736, 5 Cal. Rptr. 53, 58 (1960);
National Dev. Co. v. Gray, 316 Mass. 240, 246, 55 N.E.2d 783, 787 (1944).
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who initially receives the title to a patent,' 3 state law determines an
13 See Orkin, supa note 2, at 721-27. Orkin argues the federal courts have used their
rulemaking policies to create a federal common law based on the dormant patent clause
power (U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
This argument for a federal common law is weak because the United States Supreme
Court has acknowledged the patent clause does not eliminate the state's police power over
fraud in the assignment of an existing patent. Allen v. Riley, 203 U.S. 347 (1906). Later, the
Court even said:
The Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction of all cases arising under the patent
laws, but not of all questions in which a patent may be the subject-matter of the
controversy. For courts of a State may try questions of title, and may construe and
enforce contracts relating to patents.
New Marshall Co. v. Marshall Engine Co., 223 U.S. 473, 478 (1911) (emphasis added).
While both these cases involvedpost-invention transfers, the rule forbre-invention transfers
probably would be the same. In Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979), the
Supreme Court said: "State law is not displaced merely because the contract relates to intel-
lectual property which may or may not be patentable; the states are free to regulate the use of
such intellectual property in any manner not inconsistent withfiderdl law." Id. at 262 (emphasis
added). See Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964)(forbidding the enforcement of a con-
tract provision which exacted royalties after the patent's expiration).
This reasoning leads back to the question whether Congress has legislated in the area, so
that the dormant power would preempt any state law. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1976) provides that
"Patents shall have the attributes of personal property." Taken alone, this sentence would
suggest Congress intended that state law would control invention assignments in employment
contracts, because personal property has traditionally been defined and regulated by state
law. The federal statute, however, continues: "Applications for patents, patents, or any inter-
est therein, shall be assignable in law by an instrument in writing." This indicates not only
congressional intent to federalize the assignment ofpost-invention title, but also congressional
silence concemingpre-invention title. Using the interpretative axiom, expresrio unius est exclusio
altenrs, § 261 might even prohibit the assignment of a contingent (pre-assignment) interest.
On the other hand, strictly construing the statute as being in derogation of the common law
right of alienation, § 261 might even allow an oral assignment of the title to an invention
after it has been created but before a patent application has been filed. More likely, Congress
did not even consider pre-invention assignments.
The question, therefore, is whether the federal patent statutes, taken as a whole, leave
room for a federal common law for this particular issue-the pre-invention title to an inven-
tion. A federal common law exists for some aspects of the patent law. For example, the
Supreme Court applied a federal common law rule to eliminate licensee estoppel even though
the Court stated that state law controlled the interpretation of the patent assignment. Lear v.
Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969). The Court noted the policy concerns and the need for a uniform
federal rule. Id. at 673-74.
A federal policy or interest, however, must significantly conflict with the use of state law
before a federal common law will be fashioned. Mirree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25
(1977). Interpreting this rule, the Second Circuit has said that a desire for uniformity is an
insufficient reason to invoke a federal common law in private litigation. In re Agent Orange
Products Liab. Litig., 635 F.2d 987, 993 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981).
Although the author feels a national standard should apply, there is no compelling need for
such a uniform standard. Thus, the patent laws do not create a federal common law concern-
ing the pre-invention title to patents.
Several courts have reached the same conclusion that state law determines an employee's
status. See Lion Mfg. Corp. v. Chicago Flexible Shaft Co., 106 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1939);
Papizian v. American Steel & Wire Co., 155 F. Supp. 111 (N.D. Ohio 1957); Toner v. Sobel-
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inventor's employment status.' 4 In addition, an employer has the
burden of proving that the inventor's employment status required
the inventor to assign a particular patent.' 5 An inventors obligation
to assign his patent depends on his employment status when he actu-
ally created the invention, rather than on any expectations when he
was hired.1 6 These expectations, however, are an indication of the
employee's status. t7 The expectations can be broken down into three
categories. An employer can hire an employee and expect him to:
1) invent a specific thing (specifically-inventive employment), 2) gen-
erally exercise his inventive skills (generally-inventive employment),
or 3) not invent at all (non-inventive employment),18
1. Specifically-inventive Employment
An employee is hired to create a specific invention when his em-
ployer pays him to either invent a specific thing or solve a specific
problem.19 The inventor implicitly agrees to assign the resulting pat-
ent to his employer.20 The "specifically-inventive" employee, thus,
man, 86 F. Supp. 369 (E.D. Pa. 1949); Heath v. Zenkich, 107 Ill. App. 3d 207, 437 N.E.2d 675
(1982); A & C Eng'g Co. v. Atherholt, 355 Mich. 677, 95 N.W.2d 871, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 824
(1959).
14 Standard Brands Inc. v. U.S. Partition & Packaging Corp., 199 F. Supp. 161, 176
(E.D. Wis. 1961).
15 Bandag, Inc. v. Morening, 259 Iowa 998, 146 N.W.2d 916 (1966). This is a factual
inquiry. E.F. Drew & Co. v. Reinhard, 170 F.2d 679 (2d Cir. 1948); Forberg v. Servel, Inc.,
88 F. Supp. 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). Previously assigning a patent to his employer implies that
an inventor agreed to assign other patents to his employer. Fish v. Air-O-Fan Products Co.,
285 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1960); Marshall v. Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co., 175 F.2d 215 (3d Cir.
1944); Magnetic Mfg. Co. v. Dings Magnetic Separator Co., 16 F.2d 739 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 274 U.S. 740 (1927); Daniel Orifice Fitting Co. v. Whalen, 198 Cal. App. 2d 791, 18
Cal. Rptr. 659 (1962).
16 Houghton v. United States, 23 F.2d 386 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 592 (1928);
Forberg v. Servel, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); Oliver v. Lockport Mills, Inc., 6
Misc. 2d 356, 163 N.Y.S.2d 317 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1956), appeal dismirsed, 163 N.Y.S.2d 356
(1957).
17 See United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1932).
18 See Gullette, State Legislation Governing Ownership Rights in Inventions Under Employee Inven-
tion Agreements, 62 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 732, 733 (1980). Gullette divides employment into
"specific inventive," "general inventive," and "non inventive." Courts often ignore this three-
tiered analysis, concentrating on whether the inventor was hired to create the disputed inven-
tion. If the inventor was not so hired, the courts sometimes call him a "general employee"
even though he was hired to invent. See, e.g., United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289
U.S. 178 (1932).
19 Houghton v. United States, 23 F.2d 386 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 592 (1928);
Forberg v. Servel, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); National Dev. Co. v. Gray, 316
Mass. 240, 55 N.E.2d 783 (1944).
20 Standard Parts Co. v. Peck, 264 U.S. 52 (1924); Gill v. United States, 160 U.S. 426
(1896); Solomons v. United States, 137 U.S. 342 (1890); North American Philips Co. v.
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has a contractual and equitable duty to assign a patent-even for an
invention created without his employer's help or knowledge. 21
Courts, however, are reluctant to find a specifically-inventive em-
ployment agreement.22 They distinguish between employees hired to
invent and those hired merely to improve the embodiment of an
idea.23 Therefore, a direction to develop an already-created idea is
not a direction to invent.24
A more difficult problem arises when a specifically-inventive
employee creates an invention outside his assigned duties. Even a
specifically-inventive employee does not have to assign a patent
which is outside the scope of his employment if it is also unrelated to
his employer's business and immediate research.2 5 And, according to
the United States Supreme Court, a specifically-inventive employee
must only show that the invention is outside the scope of his employ-
ment.26 In United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp. ,27 the United States
Supreme Court allowed a federal employee to retain his patent for
an invention which the government had paid another group within
his laboratory to invent. The Court reasoned the employment con-
tract could not be so broadly construed as to imply an assignment of
Brownshield, 111 F. Supp. 762 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); National Dev. Co. v. Gray, 316 Mass. 240,55
N.E.2d 783 (1944). See generaly DELLER'S WALKER ON PATENTS §§ 376, 378 (2d ed. 1965).
21 Wellington Print Works, Inc. v. Magid, 242 F. Supp. 614 (E.D. Pa. 1965) (even an
employer who had breached his employment contract by not paying the inventor's salary has
a right to the patent); Daniel Orifice Fitting Co. v. Whalen, 198 Cal. App. 2d 791, 798-99, 18
Cal. Rptr. 659, 665 (1962); National Dev. Co. v. Gray, 316 Mass. 240, 55 N.E.2d 783 (1944);
Steranko v. Inforex Inc., 5 Mass. App. 253, 362 N.E.2d 222 (1977).
22 See Howe v. Floodmaster Mfg. Corp., 45 Ill. App. 2d 203, 195 N.E.2d 278 (1963) (a
complaint alleging the inventor was an employee was dismiss.ed because he was actually an
independent contractor).
23 National Dev. Co. v. Gray, 316 Mass. 240, 55 N.E.2d 783 (1944); Detroit Testing Lab.
v. Robison, 221 Mich. 442, 191 N.W. 218 (1922). Research scientists, see Houghton v. United
States, 23 F.2d 386 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 592 (1928), and design engineers, see Lane
& Bodley Co. v. Locke, 150 U.S. 193 (1893), are specifically inventive employees, while a
general manager, see Hapgood v. Hewitt, 119 U.S. 226 (1886), is not a specifically inventive
employee because of his diverse administrative tasks. See general Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 386
(1958).
24 Cahill v. Regan, 5 N.Y.2d 292, 157 N.E.2d 505, 184 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1959). Designing,
constructing or devising a manufacturing method are not inventive tasks because they involve
applying an idea rather than creating one. United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289
U.S. 178 (1932); Banner Metals, Inc. v. Lockwood, 178 Cal. App. 2d 643, 3 Cal. Rptr. 421
(1960); Cahill v. Regan, 5 N.Y.2d 292, 157 N.E.2d 505, 184 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1959).
25 United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1932).
26 Id. at 187. The Court specifically found that the employees were not hired to invent.
Id. at 195. In his dissent, Justice Stone interprets the majority to mean that the employees
were not hired to create that specf* invention. Id. at 213.
27 289 U.S. 178 (1932).
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all work-related patents.28
Justice Stone, in dissent, argued that an employee hired to in-
vent, whether specifically or generally, had a duty to assign the pat-
ent on any invention within his employer's scope of business because
the employment contract implies that very purpose.29 Stone's posi-
tion has received some support.30
2. Generally-inventive Employment
A generally-inventive employee is hired to pursue his creative
instincts, even if diverse from his assigned work;31 his employer antic-
ipates no specific result or invention. 32 An employee hired to gener-
ally exercise his inventive skills does not implicitly agree to assign any
resulting patents to his employer,33 although some courts infer an
agreement to assign patents arising from the inventor's work.34 In
Dubilier Condenser Corp., the Supreme Court held an employer may
own a generally-inventive employee's patent if the inventor created
the invention during working hours,35 the patent is within the em-
ployer's scope of business,36 or the inventor was assigned similar
tasks.37
28 Id. at 187-88.
29 Id. at 209. "[A]s the patent is the fruit of the very work which the employee is hired to
do and for which he is paid, it should no more be withheld from the employer, in equity and
good conscience, than the product of any service the employee engages to render." Id. at 215.
30 See Velsicol Corp. v. Hyman, 405 Ill. 352, 90 N.E.2d 717, cert. denied, 339 U.S. 966
(1950). A middle position would require an inventor to assign patents "incident" to his as-
signed duties. See Lion Mfg. Co. v. Chicago Flexible Shaft Co., 106 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1939).
31 See Gullette, supra note 18.
32 Id.
33 United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1932); Solomons v. United
States, 137 U.S. 342 (1890).
34 See International Pulverizing Corp. v. Kidwell, 7 N.J. Super. 345, 71 A.2d 151 (1950).
A comment to the Restatement (Second) of Agency also states:
If, however, one is employed to do experimental work for inventive purposes, it is
inferred ordinarily, although not so specifically agreed, that patentable ideas ar-
rived at through the experimentation are to be owned by the employer. This is
even more clear where one is employed to achieve a particular result which the
invention accomplishes.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 397 comment a (1958).
35 United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 193 (1932). But see Blum v.
Commissioner, 183 F.2d 281 (3d Cir. 1950).
36 Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. at 193. See also Belanger v. Alton Box Bd. Co., 180
F.2d 87 (7th Cir. 1950).
37 Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. at 193. Justice Stone summarized the Court's posi-
tion somewhat differently in his dissent:
The opinion of this Court apparently "rejects the distinction between specific em-
ployment or assignment and general employment to invent, . . . in favor of the
broader position . . . that wherever the employee's duties involve the exercise of
[April 1983]
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The uncertainty in this area arises from the courts' unwillingness
to adopt a clear rule. The dilemma whether to give all the patent
rights to either the inventor or his employer forces courts to blur the
analysis to reach their desired result. A court, therefore, will avoid
the generally-inventive analysis by finding either a specifically-inven-
tive or a non-inventive employment status. Courts might be more
willing to articulate their reasoning if an intermediate position were
available to divide the patent rights between an inventor and his
employer.
3. Non-inventive Employment
An employee who is not hired to invent does not impliedly agree
to assign any patent--even one created through his employment-
because his salary is not intended to be compensation for inventing.38
While a non-inventive employee owns the patent, his employer may
have a non-exclusive license to use the invention. This license exists
either because the inventor used his employer's resources in creating
the invention or because his employer promoted the invention while
reasonably expecting a royalty-free use.3 9
This three-tiered employment status analysis divides patent
rights between an inventor and his employer according to reasonable
expectations. An employee hired to create a specific invention only
does what his employer expects when he creates that invention. A
inventive powers, the employer is entitled to an assignment of the patent on any
invention made in the scope of the general employment.
Id. at 213-14 (Stone, J., dissenting). For agreement with the author's interpretation of the
Court's position, see Fersing v. Fast, 121 F.2d 531 (C.C.P.A. 1941); Milwaukee v. Activated
Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 576 (1934); but see International
Carrier-Call & Television Corp. v. R.C.A., 142 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1944).
- 38 Small v. Heywood-Wakefield Co., 13 F. Supp. 825 (D. Mass. 1936). In National Dev.
Co. v. Gray, the court noted:
One by merely entering an employment requiring the performance of services of a
noninventive nature does not lose his rights to any inventions that he may make
during the employment, athough the employment may have afforded the opportu-
nity or occasion for the conception of an idea which may lead to a patent and the
rendition of services in the course of his employment may have so enhanced his
mechanical skills, scientific knowledge and inventive facilities as to enable him to
develop and perfect the idea into a patentable article, and this is true even if the
patent is for an improvement upon a device or process used by the employer or is of
such great practical value as to supersede the devices or processes with which the
employee became familiar during his employment.
316 Mass. at 246, 55 N.E.2d at 786. See also Banner Metals, Inc. v. Lockwood, 178 Cal. App.
2d 643, 3 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1960); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 397 (1958). Seegener-
ally DELLER'S, rupra note 20, § 375.
39 National Dev. Co. v. Gray, 316 Mass. 240, 55 N.E.2d 783 (1944); see notes 58-75 in/ia
and accompanying text.
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generally-inventive employee may exceed his employer's expecta-
tions. Thus, where a generally-inventive employment is involved, the
division of patent rights is more difficult, lending itself to a case by
case analysis. Finally, a non-inventive employee always exceeds his
employer's expectations when he creates an invention. As the forego-
ing suggests, the employment status analysis provides only broad cat-
egories which give the patent rights to one party or the other. This
works well in the extreme categories-specifically-inventive or non-
inventive employment, but does not accomplish an adequate distri-
bution in the intermediate category-generally-inventive employ-
ment. A better analysis would apportion the rights in this
intermediate category according to each party's contribution.
B. Fiduc' a Duy
Some employees, usually corporate officers and directors, have a
fiduciary duty not to compete with their employers. This duty may
require an inventor to assign a particular patent to his employer.4°
Such a key employee, often called the employer's "alter-ego,"'4' has
an obligation to promote his employer's best interest by assigning a
potentially-competing invention created during his employment. 42
Unlike the employment-status analysis, 43 the fiduciary duty analysis
depends on a duty of loyalty rather than an implied agreement in
anticipation of invention. 44 An inventor is required to assign a pat-
40 Dowse v. Federal Rubber Co., 254 F. 308 (N.D. Ill. 1918); Daniel Orifice Fitting Co. v.
Whalen, 198 Cal. App. 2d 791, 18 Cal. Rptr. 659 (1962).
41 In Dowse, the court defined an "alter ego" as "whether [the inventor] occupied such a
relationship to the corporation that he was its alter ego, in such a capacity that it is consistent
with good faith that he should recognize its ownership of the patents issued to him." 254 F. at
310. In a different context, such as establishing a shareholder's tort liability, "alter ego" is
more restrictedly defined as:
that the corporation is not only influenced and governed by that person, but that
there is such a unity of interest and ownership that the individuality, or separate-
ness, of such a person and corporation has ceased, and the facts are such that an
adherence to the fiction would, under the particular circumstances, sanction a
fraud or promote injustice.
Associated Vendors, Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co., 210 Cal. App. 2d 825, 837, 26 Cal. Rptr. 806,
813 (1963). To avoid confusion, this note substitutes the term "fiduciary duty" wherever
possible. When "alter ego" appears, the author intends the Dowse definition to apply.
42 Dowse v. Federal Rubber Co., 254 F. 308 (N.D. Ill. 1918).
43 See notes 11-39 supra and accompanying text.
44 The cases do not clarify whether the fiduciary duty theory rests on an implied contract
or equitable considerations. See Preis v. Eversharp, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 98 (E.D.N.Y. 1957)
(based on implied contract); Grove v. Grove Valve & Regulator Co., 4 Cal. App. 3d 299, 84
Cal. Rptr. 300 (1970) (based on equity). If based on contract, the alter-ego can modify his
duty to assign by specifically contracting otherwise. See Preis v. Eversharp, Inc., 154 F. Supp.
98 (E.D.N.Y. 1957); Daniel Orifice Fitting Co. v. Whalen, 198 Cal. App. 2d 791, 18 Cal.
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ent to his employer under the fiduciary-duty analysis, if the employer
can show: 1) the inventor was under a fiduciary duty to his employer;
2) the inventor had an obligation to assign that type of patent; and
3) the obligation to assign the patent existed when the invention was
created.
Application of the alter-ego theory requires that the inventor
have a fiduciary duty not to compete with hzs employer. 4 State corporate
law determines who has this fiduciary duty. 46 Employment alone
does not create a fiduciary duty not to compete with one's em-
ployer.47 Rather, this fiduciary duty requires the existence of a confi-
dential relationship 4s and actual control over the operation of the
employer's business49 -an alter-ego relationship.
Once an employer establishes this fiduciary duty, the employer
must prove the alter-ego had an obligation to assign the specifr type of
invention to avoid unfair competition with the employer.5 0 Most state
corporate laws prohibit officers and directors from competing di-
rectly with the corporation by usurping a "corporate opportunity." 51
Rptr. 659 (1962). If based on equity, the alter-ego cannot contractually modify his fiduciary
duty, but may raise equitable defenses such as laches or unclean hands. The author believes
the contract theory better suits modern practice because of the need for flexibility to suit
individual circumstances.
45 Dowse v. Federal Rubber Co., 254 F. 308 (N.D. Ill. 1918); Melin v. United States, 478
F.2d 1210 (Ct. Cl. 1973). The alter-ego theory arose in a corporate setting but also applies to
partnerships. See Burr v. De La Vergne, 102 N.Y. 415, 7 N.E. 366 (1886).
46 Tripp v. United States, 406 F.2d 1066 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
47 United States v. Snepp, 595 F.2d 926 (4th Cir. 1979) (a contract can create a fiduciary
duty but not all contractual duties are fiduciary); Banner Metals, Inc. v. Lockwood, 178 Cal.
App. 2d 643, 3 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1960)(the position's title is not controlling); National
Rejectors, Inc. v. Trieman, 409 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1966)(en banc).
48 Vigitron, Inc. v. Ferguson, 120 N.H. 638, 419 A.2d 1115 (1980). The existence of a
confidential relationship must be determined from the state corporate laws.
49 Melin v. United States, 478 F.2d 1210 (Ct. Cl. 1973). Thus, a president who is the
majority stockholder, LeFiell v. United States, 162 Ct. Cl. 865 (1963); Grove v. Grove Valve
& Regulator Co., 4 Cal. App. 3d 299, 84 Cal. Rptr. 300 (1970), an elected president, Preis v.
Eversharp, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 98 (E.D.N.Y. 1957), a vice-president for development, Daniel
Orifice Fitting Co. v. Whalen, 198 Cal. App. 2d 791, 18 Cal. Rptr. 659 (1962), a vice-presi-
dent and sales manager, Diversey Corp. v. Mertz, 13 F. Supp. 410 (N.D. Ill. 1936), and even a
non-officer who actually runs the business, Transparent Ruler Co. v. C-Thru Ruler Co., 129
Conn. 369, 28 A.2d 232 (1942), have a fiduciary duty to assign potentially competing inven-
tions to their employers. A general manager, on the other hand, does not have such a fiduci-
ary duty because he can compete with his employer. Holders Mfg., Inc. v. Cudd, 80 Idaho
557, 335 P.2d 890 (1959). Even a vice-president, general manager and principal shareholder
is not his employer's alter-ego if another person actually runs the business. Melin v. United
States, 478 F.2d 1210 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
50 Detroit Testing Lab. v. Robison, 221 Mich. 442, 191 N.W. 218 (1922).
51 See Davis v. Alwac Int'l, Inc., 369 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963); HENN, LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 236 (2d ed. 1970). See also Science Accessories Corp. v. Summagraphics
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Other states, applying a broader rule, forbid officers and directors
from even creating a "conflicting interest. '52 Finally, a few states,
applying a narrower rule, only prevent officers and directors from
obtaining an opportunity learned through "official duties. ' 53 The
conflicting interest rule apportions patents most equitably because it
embodies the modern opinion of a corporate officer's fiduciary duties.
Under that rule, an employer receives patents which would directly
compete with its products, while the alter-ego retains the opportunity
to create in subject areas where his employer does not compete.54
Finally, an employer must prove the inventor created the inven-
tion while under an obligation to assign the resulting patent to the
employer.55 An inventor does not have to assign a patent simply be-
cause he later becomes an alter-ego of an employer needing his in-
vention.56 Likewise, a former alter-ego does not have to assign a
patent for an invention created after leaving his position, even if he
had worked on the same problem while an alter-ego.57
The fiduciary duty analysis prevents an influential employee
from abusing his confidential position or defrauding a trusting em-
ployer. The analysis, therefore, fulfills legitimate business expecta-
tions. Like the employment-status analysis, the fiduciary duty
analysis varies somewhat from state to state depending on the state
corporate law. Unlike the employment status analysis, the fiduciary
duty analysis is well suited to actual situations because it focuses on
relatively clear-cut principles of confidentiality and fiduciary duty.
C. Shop Right
Even if an inventor owns a patent, his employer may have a
Corp., 425 A.2d 957 (Del. 1980)(a corporate opportunity is something the corporation is
financially able to undertake, within its line of business and one it is interested in).
52 See Daniel Orifice Fitting Co v. Whalen, 198 Cal. App. 2d 791, 800-01, 18 Cal. Rptr.
659, 667 (1962)(the law demands a scrupulous observance of an officer's duty not only to
protect the corporate interest but also to refrain from doing anything that would injure the
corporation or deprive it of profit which his skills might properly bring it); HENN, su/ra note
51, § 237.
53 See Detroit Testing Lab. v. Robison, 221 Mich. 442, 191 N.W. 218 (1922); HENN, supra
note 51, § 237.
54 The conflicting interest test does not require an alter-ego to assign patents which the
corporation would be indifferent to or only marginally benefit from. The corporation, on the
other hand, is protected from the alter-ego keeping a potentially competing invention.
55 Melin v. United States, 478 F.2d 1210 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
56 Melin v. United States, 478 F.2d 1210 (Ct. Cl. 1973); Grove v. Grove Valve & Regula-
tor Co., 4 Cal. App. 3d 299, 84 Cal. Rptr. 300 (1970).
57 See Daniel Orifice Fitting Co. v. Whalen, 198 Cal. App. 2d 791, 18 Cal. Rptr. 659
(1962); Steranko v. Inforex, Inc., 5 Mass. App. 253, 362 N.E.2d 222 (1977).
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"shop right," a license to use the invention, because the inventor
either used his employer's resources in creating the invention,58 or
allowed his employer to promote the invention with the expectation
of royalty-free use.59
A shop right is an employer's royalty-free, non-exclusive, and
non-transferable license to use an employee's patented invention. 60
An employment relationship does not automatically create a shop
right.6' Rather, the employer must establish, under state law,62 an
implied contract creating a shop right.63 Therefore, if the inventor
and his employer have already entered into an express agreement
concerning patent rights, a court will not infer a shop right.64
An inventor who uses even a small amount of his employer's
time, facilities or money to develop an idea, may impliedly give his
employer a shop right in the resulting invention.65 Although courts
58 United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1932); Banner Metals, Inc.
v. Lockwood, 178 Cal. App. 2d 643, 3 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1960).
59 See Gill v. United States, 160 U.S. 426 (1896); Melin v. United States, 478 F.2d 1210
(Ct. Cl. 1973); Hobbs v. United States, 376 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1967), modifted, 451 F.2d 849
(5th Cir. 1971); Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corp. v. Maurice A. Garbell, Inc., 204 F.2d 946
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 873 (1953); Cahill v. Regan, 5 N.Y.2d 292, 157 N.E.2d 505,
184 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1959).
60 United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1932); Marshall v. Colgate-
Palmolive-Peet Co., 175 F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1949); Banner Metals, Inc. v. Lockwood, 178 Cal.
App. 2d 643, 3 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1960). Generally, a direct employer-employee relationship
must exist to give rise to a shop right. Hobbs v. United States, 376 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1967).
But see Francklyn v. Guilford Packing Co., 695 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1983). Courts disagree
over whether a shop right is a contractual or equitable right. See, e.g., Gemco Eng'g & Mfg.
Co. v. Henderson, 151 Ohio St. 95, 84 N.E.2d 596 (1949).
61 Aero Bolt & Screw Co. v. Iaia, 180 Cal. App. 2d 728, 5 Cal. Rptr. 53 (1960); Banner
Metals, Inc. v. Lockwood, 178 Cal. App. 2d 643, 3 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1960).
62 Id.
63 United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1932); Gill v. United States,
160 U.S. 426 (1896); Neon Signal Device, Inc. v. Alpha-Claude Neon Corp., 54 F.2d 793
(W.D. Pa. 1931); Banner Metals, Inc. v. Lockwood, 178 Cal. App. 2d 643, 3 Cal. Rptr. 421
(1960). Older cases alternately applied a contract or equitable estoppel theory. See Annot.,
61 A.L.R.2d 356, 363 (1958).
64 Jamesbury Corp. v. Worchester Valve Co., 443 F.2d 205 (Ist Cir. 1971); B.F. Gladding
& Co. v. Scientific Anglers, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 236 (E.D. Mich. 1956); Aero Bolt & Screw Co.
v. Iaia, 180 Cal. App. 2d 728, 5 Cal. Rptr. 53 (1960). If the employer pays royalties for the
invention's use, a court will not infer a shop right. Gemco Eng'g & Mfg. Co. v. Henderson,
151 Ohio St. 95, 84 N.E.2d 596 (1949). An employer who tells an inventor to stop working on
an idea waives any accrued shop right. Dewey v. American Stair Glide Corp., 557 S.W.2d
643 (Mo. App. 1977).
65 United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1932); Papazian v. Ameri-
can Steel & Wire Co., 155 F. Supp. 111 (N.D. Ohio 1957). In Dubilier Condenser Corp., the
Supreme Court said:
[Where a servant, during his hours of employment, working with his master's
materials and appliances, conceives and perfects an invention for which he obtains
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may be liberal in creating shop rights,66 they at least require that the
inventor have used some of his employer's resources. 67 For example,
a shop right may be established if an inventor works on his invention
for a short time "during the hours of employment. '68 Even if an
inventor creates an invention on his own time, his employer may re-
ceive a shop right if the inventor used the employer's facilities in cre-
ating the invention. 69 This may be true even if the use is minimal. 70
An employer also obtains a shop right by developing an inven-
tion with the reasonable expectation of royalty-free use.71 However,
the employer must reasonably rely on an inventor's conduct which
manifested assent to the free use.
A shop right exists for the life of the patent even if the employ-
ment relationship terminates earlier.72 Under the shop right, the em-
a patent, he must accord his master a non-exclusive right to practice the inven-
tion. . . .Since the servant uses his master's time, facilities and materials to attain
a concrete result, the latter is in equity entitled to use that which embodies his own
property and to duplicate it as often as he may find occasion to employ similar
appliances in his business.
289 U.S. at 188-89. Since the Dubilier Condenser Corp. decision, the shop right concept has been
broadened to include instances when only one factor is present. See Hobbs v. United States,
376 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1967); Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corp. v. Maurice A. Garbell, Inc.,
204 F.2d 946 (9th Cir. 1953); Gemco Eng'g & Mfg. Co. v. Henderson, 151 Ohio St. 95, 84
N.E.2d 596 (1949); Dewey v. American Stair Glide Corp., 557 S.W.2d 643 (Mo. App. 1977).
66 See, e.g., Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corp. v. Maurice A. Garbell, Inc., 204 F.2d 946
(9th Cir. 1953). But see Hobbs v. United States, 376 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1967).
67 McNamara v. Powell, 256 A.D. 554, 11 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1939).
68 Gemco Eng'g & Mfg. Co. v. Henderson, 151 Ohio St. 95, 84 N.E.2d 596 (1949).
"Hours of employment" is narrowly defined, so it excludes lunch hour and aftework hours.
Dewey v. American Stair Glide Corp., 557 S.W.2d 643 (Mo. App. 1977). But, officers are not
limited to those restricted hours. Wellington Print Works, Inc. v. Magid, 242 F. Supp. 614
(E.D. Pa. 1965).
69 Kinkade v. New York Shipbldg. Corp., 21 NJ. 362, 122 A.2d 360 (1956).
70 Traditionally, minimal use, such as $4.20 worth of welding equipment, created a shop
right. Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corp. v. Maurice A. Garbell, Inc., 204 F.2d 946 (9th Cir.
1953). See also Callahan v. Capron, 280 F. 254 (D.R.I. 1922). Some forward-looking courts,
however, have ignored such trivial use because employees routinely use small quantities of
their employer's material for non-inventive purposes. Aero Bolt & Screw Co. v. Iaia, 180 Cal.
App. 2d 728, 5 Cal. Rptr. 53 (1960); Banner Metals, Inc. v. Lockwood, 178 Cal. App. 2d 643,
3 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1960); Dewey v. American Stair Glide Corp., 557 S.W.2d 643 (Mo. App.
1977).
71 Francklyn v. Guilford Packing Co., 695 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1983); Davis Harvester
Co., Inc. v. Long Mfg. Co., 252 F. Supp. 989 (E.D.N.C. 1966), afd, 373 F.2d 513 (4th Cir.
1967).
72 Tin Decorating Co. v. Metal Package Corp., 29 F.2d 1006 (D.C.N.Y. 1928), afd, 37
F.2d 5 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 759 (1930). At one time, the continued existence of a
shop right depended on whether the inventor still worked for that employer. See City of
Boston v. Allen, 91 F. 248 (lst Cir. 1898) (at that time, a shop right for an invention embodied
in a machine only lasted as long as the machine continued to operate while a shop right in a
process continued for the life of the patent).
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ployer can make, use, and sell articles embodying the patented
invention.73 This right, however, does not permit the employer to
sell articles outside his normal range of business.74 The employer
cannot voluntarily transfer the shop right, but a legal successor, such
as a bankruptcy receiver or a successor corporation, can exercise the
shop right.75
The shop right doctrine equitably distributes patent rights be-
tween an inventor and his employer-the inventor retains the pat-
ent's title and his employer obtains the invention's free use. The shop
right doctrine attempts to divide the patent rights between an inven-
tor and his employer rather than give the rights to one or the other.
If courts, following the modern trend, ignore minimal uses, the shop
right doctrine will adequately reflect the parties' presumed intent.
D. Express Contract
Most modern employers, unwilling to allow vague common law
doctrines to determine their patent rights, use express written con-
tracts to allocate patent rights between themselves and their employ-
ees. 76 The overwhelming majority of states77 allow these contracts
which usually transfer all of the inventor's patent rights to the em-
ployer in return for the inventor's regular salary.78 Consequently, the
employer can plan a steady expense rather than risk the unproject-
able future costs of obtaining the patent rights at a later date.
73 Brown v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co., 374 A.2d 842 (Del. Ch.), rev'd on other
grounds, 403 A.2d 1114 (Del. 1977); Gemco Eng'g & Mfg. Co. v. Henderson, 151 Ohio St. 95,
84 N.E.2d 594 (1949).
74 Francklyn v. Guilford Packing Co., 695 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1983); Thompson v. Amer-
ican Tobacco Co., 174 F.2d 773, 778 (4th Cir. 1949).
75 Lane & Bodley Co. v. Locke, 150 U.S. 193 (1893) (employee continued to work for
successor); General Paint Corp. v. Kramer, 68 F.2d 40 (10th Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 292 U.S.
623 (1934)(a parent corporation cannot use its subsidiary's shop rights as long as they retain
their separate corporate identities); Neon Signal Devices Inc. v. Alpha-Claude Neon Corp., 54
F.2d 793 (W.D. Pa. 1931); Wilson v. J.G. Wilson Corp., 241 F. 494 (C.D. Va. 1917). But see
Hapgood v. Hewitt, 119 U.S. 226 (1886). See generally DELLER'S, supra note 20, § 409.
76 See Orkin, supra note 2. These agreements supercede the common law. Jamesbury
Corp. v. Worchester Valve Co., 443 F.2d 205 (lst Cir. 1971). Once a particular contract is
found invalid, the employer's rights will be determined under the common law. See Steranko
v. Inforex, Inc., 5 Mass. App. 253, 362 N.E.2d 222 (1977).
77 California, Minnesota, North Carolina and Washington have statutory restrictions on
invention assignments in employment contracts. See notes 117-22 infra and accompanying
text. State law controls the interpretation and validity of express patent assignments. Combs
v. Plough, Inc., 681 F.2d 469 (6th Cir. 1982); Stanfield v. Osborne Industries, Inc., 7 Kan.
App. 416, 643 P.2d 1115 (1982); A & C Eng'g Co. v. Atherholt, 355 Mich. 677, 95 N.W.2d
871, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 824 (1959); Arena v. Coldelite Corp., 205 U.S.P.Q. 566 (N.J. Super.
1979).
78 See Orkin, supra note 2.
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Unfortunately, the law imposes few restrictions on these express
contracts.79 In consideration for a terminable-at-will employment
contract,80 an employee may even assign inventions created before
his employment," and those to be created after he resigns.82 While
an inventor theoretically can attack an employment contract requir-
ing a patent assignment like any other contract,8 3 courts are gener-
ally unsympathetic to the inventor.8 4
The courts seem to ignore the employer's inherently stronger
bargaining position and superior legal knowledge. For example, em-
ployment contracts that assign patents rarely fail for lack of consider-
ation because the inventor's continued employment is considered
adequate compensation.8 5 Also, public policy does not prohibit an
employee from assigning his future inventions.8 6 Patent rights, like
other property rights,8 7 can be alienated before coming into exist-
79 See DuPont Rayon Co. v. Paley, 4 F. Supp. 290 (N.D. Ill. 1933), afd, 71 F.2d 856 (7th
Cir. 1934), where the district court stated:
There is a modern philosophy to the effect that earned income should be more
liberally returned to the individual making it possible, but until such policy shall be
reflected in legislation invalidating a contract of sale of inventive labor, this court is
powerless to afford relief against situations which parties, mentally competent, have
created for themselves.
4 F. Supp. at 292.
80 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Miller, 22 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1927); Magnetic Mfg.
Co. v. Dings Magnetic Separator Co., 16 F.2d 739 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 274 U.S. 740 (1927).
81 Rotary Lift Co. v. Clayton, 127 F. Supp. 176 (D. Mass. 1954); Holders Mfg. Co. v.
Cudd, 80 Idaho 557, 335 P.2d 890 (1959).
82 Conway v. White, 9 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1925).
83 See Conway v. White, 9 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1925); Rotary Lift Co. v. Clayton, 127 F.
Supp. 176 (D. Mass. 1954).
84 See Stedman, The Employed Inventor, the Public Interest, and Horse and Buggy Law in the Space
Age, 4 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1970), reprinted in 2 PAT. L. REv. 207 (1970).
85 Fish v. Air-O-Fan Products Co., 285 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1960); Conway v. White, 9
F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1925). Previously negotiated employment might not be new consideration
for a subsequent assignment agreement. Hewett v. Samsonite Corp., 32 Colo. App. 150, 507
P.2d 1119 (1973). See also Muenzer v. W.F. &John Barnes Co., 9 Ill. App. 2d 391, 133 N.E.2d
312 (1956) (employee's salary tied to sales rather than invention). In states where the ade-
quacy of consideration can be challenged, an inventor may argue his employer did not give
enough consideration because the employee's salary was only paid for his normal duties. See
generally CALAMARI & PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 4-3 (2d ed. 1977).
86 Conway v. White, 9 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1925). But see Alam, Employer's Obligations Re-
garding Employee Inventions-A New Perspective, 8 EMPL. REL. LJ. 463 (1982), for a strong argu-
ment why public policy should limit these agreements. See generally DELLER'S, supra note 20,
§ 373.
87 The courts do not distinguish between patent rights and more concrete property
rights. The author believes that intellectual property rights are considerably different be-
cause they are not attributable to any particular individual before they come into existence
and the potential owner can prevent the rights from vesting in himself but cannot guarantee
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ence.88  Using the fiction of equal bargaining position, courts have
refused to void these adhesion contracts as unreasonable, 89 uncon-
scionable,90 or against public policy. 9 1 But, modern developments in
adhesion contract theory may mitigate these harsh results.
The inventor's best chance to successfully attack the assignment
contract is to allege fraud in its execution. The inventor, however,
must "clearly and cogently" prove fraud. 92 In Roberts v. Sears Roebuck
& Co. ,93 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
affirmed a jury award94 of one million dollars in damages to an in-
ventor whose employer had fraudulently obtained a patent assign-
ment. The court held that Sears, during the licensing negotiations,
breached its fiduciary duty to Roberts, its employee, by fraudently
misstating the invention's ownership, patentability, and market
value. The court noted that these misstatements were made worse by
the existence of an employment relationship, the exchange of confi-
dential information, and the disparity in age, intelligence, and busi-
they will come into existence. But see Muenzer v. W.F. &John Barnes Co., 9 Ill. App. 2d 391,
406 (1956)(inventive talents can be contracted for just as mechanical skills).
88 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966)(rejecting the natural rights theory);
Conway v. White, 9 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1925). See generaly DELLER'S, supra note 20, § 347.
89 Conway v. White, 9 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1925). A turn-of-the-century case holds that an
employer's threat to fire an inventor for refusing to assign a patent does not constitute duress.
Barr Car Co. v. Chicago.& N. W. Ry., 110 F. 972 (7th Cir. 1901), cert. denied, 186 U.S. 484
(1902). An employer does not even unreasonably coerce an inventor by saying the inventor
will have difficulties finding another job. Rotary Lift Co. v. Clayton, 127 F. Supp. 176 (D.
Mass. 1954). Modern notions of reasonableness and duress probably would change these
results.
90 Patent & Licensing Corp. v. Olsen, 188 F.2d 522 (2d Cir. 1951); Guth v. Minnesota
Mining & Mfg. Co., 72 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 711 (1935); Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Miller, 22 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1927); Conway v. White, 9 F.2d 863 (2d
Cir. 1925). The theory of unconscionability has undergone drastic changes in recent times, so
these old cases may be inapplicable. See Stedman, supra note 84.
91 Conway v. White, 9 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1925).
92 DuPont Rayon Co. v. Paley, 4 F. Supp. 290 (N.D. Ill. 1933), aftd, 71 F.2d 856 (7th Cir.
1934). See also Arena v. Coldelite, 205 U.S.P.Q. 566 (N.J. Super. 1979)(an inventor's mistake
in law-thinking he had to assign his patent to his employer-does not create a cause of
action without the addition of fraud).
93 573 F.2d 976 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 860 (1978), on remand, 617 F.2d 460 (7th
Cir.), cer. denied, 449 U.S. 975 (1980).
94 The jury awarded damages while the Seventh Circuit, on remand, refused to allow
restitution. Like most employer-employee cases, most issues are factkial questions. Consoli-
dated Vultee Aircraft Corp. v. Maurice A. Garbell, Inc., 204 F.2d 946 (9th Cir. 1953); Banner
Metals, Inc. v. Lockwood, 178 Cal. App. 2d 643, 3 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1960). It is rare for such
issues to be tried before a jury because, rather than seeking damages, the parties often seek
equitable relief-either the employer wants an injunction requiring the inventor to assign a
patent, or the inventor asks the court to rescind an already executed agreement. See North
American Philips Co. v. Brownshield, 111 F. Supp. 762 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). Juries might be
more sympathetic to the employed inventor.
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ness experience between Sears' patent attorney and Roberts, a
teenager.95 Thus, at least one circuit court has imposed a duty of fair
dealing on an employer negotiating with his employee over rights to
the employee's invention.
An inventor may also attack the duration of a patent assignment
clause in an employment contract. An inventor can freely assign an
invention created before his employment. 96 This is not a serious
problem because both parties have an idea of the invention's value
which can be reflected in the employee's salary. But, an employment
contract's assignment of patents for inventions which might be cre-
ated after the inventor has terminated his employment (a trailer
clause) raises unfair competition questions. 97
Trailer clauses 98 are a product of the tension between an inven-
tor's rights to create, and to seek future employment-and his em-
ployer's right to protect confidential information. An inventor has a
right to use skills and knowledge gained through prior employment;99
thus, his former-employer cannot require him to-forego his inventive
powers.100 In addition, an employee has the right during his employ-
ment to plan to compete with his employer once he has resigned.10'
The employer, however, can protect his confidential information for
95 573 F.2d at 983. Roberts, age 18, invented a quick release socket wrench. He filed a
patent application and submitted his invention to Sears, his employer. After conducting sev-
eral tests to determine the invention's value, Sears knowingly underrepresented the inven-
tion's value in its licensing negotiations with Roberts. In addition, Sears channeled some
work to Robert's patent attorney, creating a conflict of interest. When Roberts discovered the
real value of his invention, he sued for damages. Once the jury awarded damages, Roberts
amended his complaint to seek rescission of the original licensing agreement and an account-
ing of Sear's profits. In a followup case, the Seventh Circuit, relying on a choice of remedy,
refused to allow the district court to force Sears to restitute its unjust enrichment. Roberts v.
Sears Roebuck & Co., 617 F.2d 460 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 975 (1980). Sears had
already voluntarily reassigned the patent to Roberts. As a result, Sears made forty-four mil-
lion dollars on Roberts' patent and only paid him one million dollars. 617 F.2d at 467
(Swygert, J., dissenting).
96 Rotary Lift Co. v. Clayton, 127 F. Supp. 176 (D. Mass. 1954). The court will not
imply such an assignment. Rigging Int'l Maint. Co. v. Gwin, 128 Cal. App. 3d 594, 180 Cal.
Rptr. 451 (1982).
97 See United Shoe Mach. Co. v. La Chapelle, 212 Mass. 467, 99 N.E. 289 (1912).
98 A trailer clause binds an inventor to assign the patent for any invention created by
him during some limited time following the termination of his employment. Doherty & landi-
orio, The Law of the Employed Inventor-Tine for a Change?, 57 MASS. L.Q. 27, 36 (1972).
99 National Rejectors, Inc. v. Trieman, 409 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1966)(en bane); Welex Jet
Servs., Inc. v. Owen, 325 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
100 Welex Jet Servs., Inc. v. Owen, 325 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959). See also Hick-
ory Specialties v. B & L Laboratory, Inc., 592 S.W.2d 583 (Tenn. App. 1979).
101 National Rejectors, Inc. v. Trieman, 409 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1966)(en bane).
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a reasonable "time.t° 2 An employer can also prevent an employee
from creating an invention while employed and saving it until after
he resigns.'0 3
Because of this tension, a trailer clause is not void per se; rather,
the clause's reasonableness determines its validity. 0 4 A clause is un-
reasonable if it: 1) extends beyond any apparent protection which
the employer reasonably requires; 2) prevents the inventor from seek-
ing other employment; or 3) adversely impacts the public. 0 5 There-
fore, a trailer clause is valid when limited to a reasonable time 0 6 and
to the subject matter an inventor worked with or had knowledge of
102 G T I Corp. v. Calhoon, 309 F. Supp. 762 (S.D. Ohio 1969). But see Armorlite Lens
Co. v. Campbell, 340 F. Supp. 273 (S.D. Cal. 1972) (former employee only required to assign
patents based on the employer's confidential information).
103 New Jersey Zinc Co. v. Singmaster, 71 F.2d 277 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 591
(1934); National Dev. Co. v. Gray, 316 Mass. 240, 55 N.E.2d 783 (1944); International Pul-
verizing Corp. v. Kidwell, 7 N.J. Super. 345 (1950). But see Jamesbury Corp. v. Worchester
Valve Co., 443 F.2d 205 (1st Cir. 1971) (employee could take idea short of invention even if in
bad faith).
104 Universal Winding Co. v. Clarke, 108 F. Supp. 329 (D.Conn. 1952)(the court empha-
sized the inventor had no prior experience in the field and the limitation covered an insignifi-
cant fraction of the machine design field). See generally DELLER'S, supra note 20, § 374.
105 Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. United States, 432 F.2d 447 (Ct. Cl. 1970); G T I Corp. v.
Calhoon, 309 F. Supp. 762 (S.D. Ohio 1969); Universal Winding Co. v. Clarke, 108 F. Supp.
329 (D. Conn. 1952).
106 A court will uphold a one-year restriction on inventing in a particular field, Universal
Winding Co. v. Clarke, 108 F. Supp. 329 (D. Conn. 1952), but will strike down a broad five
year restriction on inventing as an unreasonable restraint of trade, G T I Corp. v. Calhoon,
309 F. Supp. 762 (S.D. Ohio 1969).
The Clarke court explained in dicta one of its reasons for upholding a restriction:
In the long run, the public is better served by giving a year's head-start in the
competitive race to a manufacturer who has ventured his capital and skill in re-
search and in the practical application of the accumulation of his knowledge and
experience in that field, than by leaving such a one to start the race at scratch with
a competitor having no such stake in the business.
108 F. Supp. at 334. Compare the Clarke court's reasoning with the dicta in Caloon striking
down a restriction:
First, a court could not enforce such a restraint. .. . Second, such restraint would
be unduly harsh. . . . Third, a court has no power to compel an employee to erase
from his mind knowledge which he has acquired from his employer.
With respect to the question of whether the provision of [the] contract requir-
ing [the inventor] to assign all ideas and improvements for a period of five years
after termination of his employment contract is void against public policy, three
principals of law must be considered: 1) Is the restraint reasonable in the sense that
it is no greater than necessary to protect the employer in some legitimate interest?
2) Is the restraint reasonable in the sense that it is not unduly harsh and oppressive
on the employee? 3) Is the restraint reasonable in the sense that it is not injurious to
the public?
309 F. Supp. at 767, 773.
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during his employment. 0 7
Adhesion contracts shift what well-reasoned balance is found in
the employment-status, fiduciary-duty, and shop-right analyses to an
employer dominated situation. Because of the employer's strong bar-
gaining position, he can deprive an inventor of his patent rights
before the invention even comes into existence. Unfortunately, the
existing law in most states does not prevent an employer from caus-
ing this imbalance. The legislature should restore this balance by
limiting an inventor's power to contract away his patent rights.
II. Statutory Modifications
The common law methods for distributing patent rights may
result in an inequitable distribution. These methods arose in an era
when employees had few rights but employers were too small to take
full-advantage of the legal imbalance. 108 But, as employers have
grown more powerful, they have been able to obtain more and more
employee patent rights through contracts. Even where the employer
does not overreach in the contract, a more fundamental problem ex-
ists simply because the modern employee has no immediate stake in
his invention. If an inventor contracts away his present interest in an
undiscovered invention, he may be unwilling to undergo the risks
associated with promoting his invention. Thus, without the potential
for direct gain from his invention, an inventor may abandon a radi-
cal proposal rather than risk his employer's displeasure.
Several alternative statutory schemes would improve the present
common law system of allocating patent rights between an inventor
and his employer. Most reformers agree that the employed inventor
is undercompensated10 9 However, they differ over what method
would properly increase the inventor's compensation and what
107 One court has stated:
Hold-over clauses are simply a recognition of the fact of business life that employees
sometimes carry with them to new employers inventions or ideas so related to work
done for a former employer that in equity and good conscience the fruits of that
work should belong to that former employer. In construing and applying hold-over
clauses, the courts have held that they must be limited to reasonable times. . . and
to subject matter which an employee worked on or had knowledge of during his
employment. . . . Unless expressly agreed otherwise, an employer has no right
under a hold-over clause to inventions made outside the scope of the employee's
former activities, and made on and with a subsequent employer's time and funds.
Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. United States, 432 F.2d 447, 452 (Ct. Cl. 1970). Even if a trailer clause is
unreasonable, some courts will enforce the clause to the extent it is reasonable. See Guth v.
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 72 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 711 (1935).
108 See Stedman, supra note 84.
109 See Orkin, supra note 2.
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amount the employer should retain as compensation" for his invest-
ment in research and development. 10
Other countries use various statutory approaches. Some coun-
tries limit the inventor's ability to alienate his patent rights, either by
preventing him from assigning potential patent rights before an in-
vention is created,' or by requiring him to retain an interest in his
patented invention.,"2 Many countries require an employer to share
an invention's value with the inventor." 3 Finally, most socialist
countries award the inventor a bonus for each patented invention."14
This country needs similar statutory reform. In the past five
years, four states" 5 have enacted statutes prohibiting an employer
from requiring the assignment of certain inventions as a condition of
employment. Congress has considered several bills ' 16 requiring an
employer to share an invention's value with the inventor and prohib-
iting an employer from requiring the assignment of certain inven-
tions as a prerequisite to employment.
A. State Statutes
The state statutes attempt to prevent an employer from abusing
his unequal bargaining power. These statutes limit the type of inven-
tions which an employer can contractually require an inventor to
assign. Under these statutes, the employment-status, fiduciary-duty,
110 Id
111 See Neumeyer, supra note 1 (Japan).
112 Id. (Austria).
113 Id. (Denmark, West Germany and Sweden). In 1977, the United Kingdom replaced
its common law employee patent right distribution system with a statutory compensation
scheme similar to the other members of the Common Market. The Patent Act of 1977, § 39-
43, 47 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 1052-58 (3d ed. 1977). Under the 1977 English
Patent Act, an inventor retains all patent rights except ones made: a) "in the course of [his]
normal duties [or ones] specifically assigned to him, and. . . an invention might reasonably
be expected" [generally-inventive employment] or b) the inventor "had a special obligation to
further the interests of the employer's undertaking" [a fiduciary duty]. Id. § 39. The inven-
tor's compensation depends on his duties and remunerations, his effort and skill in making the
invention, other people's contribution to the invention, and the employer's contribution in
creating and developing the invention. Id. § 41.
This well-drafted English statute appears to adapt the common law catagories to a statu-
tory compensation scheme. American reformers should examine the results in England, and,
perhaps, the United States should follow the English lead. For a general interpretation of the
English statute, see Reid, Employee Inventions Under the Patent Act 1977, 1979 J. Bus. L. 350.
114 See Neumeyer, supra note I (U.S.S.R.).
115 California, Minnesota, North Carolina, and Washington. The Wall Street Journal
Article, supra note 1, reported that Illinois passed similar legislation, but Enlow, Employer and
Employee Agreements, 1982 PAT. L. ANN. 103, noted the legislation was only pending, and the
author verified that fact.
116 Brown (1947), Moss (1971), Hart-Owens (1974) and Kastenmeier (1981).
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and shop-right tests remain largely unchanged. The statutes differ
only slightly in which types of inventions are assignable and in who
has the burden of proving whether a particular invention falls within
the category of those which must be assigned.
In 1977, Minnesota passed the first "freedom to create" stat-
ute.1 7 The statute voids, as against public policy, any provision in
an employment agreement which requires an inventor to assign an
invention which was- created without using his employer's "equip-
ment, supplies, facility or trade secret," which is unrelated to the em-
ployer's business or research, and which did not result from work the
inventor performed for his employer. The inventor has the burden of
proving that a particular invention falls within the statutory
prohibition. " 8
Washington's freedom to create statute is based on the Minne-
sota statute. Under the Washington statute, however, the employer
has the burden of proving the statute applies to a particular inven-
tion."t9 The California statute 20 does not require as direct a rela-
tionship between the subject matter of the invention and the
employer's business as the other state statutes. 12' This difference
favoring the employer is mitigated since the legislative intent indi-
cates that the term employer should be read narrowly. 22
These state statutes restore a contractual balance between the
inventor and his employer. Under these state statutes, however, an
117 MINN. STAT. § 181.78 (1977).
118 Id. The Minnesota statute reads: "Any provision . . . which provides . . . shall not
apply . . . ," so the inventor has the burden of proving the provision's existence and its
illegality.
119 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.44.140 (1979). The Washington statute reads: "A provi-
sion. . . which provides. . . does not apply. . . unless ... " Thus, the statute leaves the
employer with the final burden of proof once the inventor establishes the prima facie case.
120 CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 2870, 2871 (West 1979).
121 The California legislature eliminated the word "directly" from the Minnesota statute.
Thus, an invention which has many applications, including one useful to the employer, is
covered by the California statute while the other state statutes may allow the inventor to
retain the patent.
122 The California statute's author submitted the following statement to the legislature
during deliberations:
In order to ensure that the patent rights of employees do not fluctuate wildly de-.
pending upon the market position of an employee's remote parent corporation, it is
necessary to declare as the legislative intent of AB 474 that in a corporation having
multiple divisions, affiliates, subsidiaries, profit centers or companies, the term em-
ployee (sic) as used in AB 474 shall relate only to the division, affiliate, subsidiary,
profit center, or company (whichever unit is smallest) rather than to the parent
corporation.
Gullette, supra note 18, at 752 (Gullette's emphasis deleted).
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inventor still must assign certain patents without present or future
compensation. Therefore, they do not address the more fundamental
problem of giving the inventor a stake in his invention.
B. Proposed Federal Statutes
Several proposals designed to improve the rights of the em-
ployed inventor have been introduced into Congress. The earliest
measure, the Brown Bill, 23 would have invalidated any patent as-
signment in an employment contract. 24 This extreme solution was
soundly defeated.125 In the late sixties, Congressman Moss' 26 intro-
duced a bill which would have required an employer to share an
invention's value with its inventor.127 The Moss Bill died in commit-
tee.128 A bill introduced in 1974, the Hart-Owens Bill, 29 which also
died in committee, 30 would have required that a minimum of two
percent of an invention's value be given to the inventor. In 1981,
Congressman Kastenmeier13' introduced two bills. The first would
have prohibited an employer from requiring pre-invention assign-
ment of certain inventions; 3 2 the second sought to establish an arbi-
tration board to award adequate compensation to the inventor.'33
Although Congress did not enact Kastenmeier's bills, the growing
number of state statutes may pressure Congress to create a national
standard.
1. The Moss Bill
In 1969 Congressman Moss introduced a bill seeking to elimi-
nate employment agreements as a method of allocating patent rights
123 The bill was named after Congressman George E. Brown, Jr., D. Cal.
124 H.R. 4932, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), reprinzted in Orkin, supra note 2, at 657, reinlro-
ducedas H.R. 5918, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
125 See Orkin, supra note 2.
126 Congressman John E. Moss was a Democrat from California.
127 H.R. 15512, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), reprinledin 116 CONG. REc. 744 (1970), reintro-
ducedas H.R. 1483, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
128 See Orkin, supra note 2.
129 S. 1321, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (introduced by Sen. Gary Hart, D. Col.), reprinted
in 119 CONG. REG. 9102, and H.R. 7111, 93 Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (introduced by Rep.
Owens, D. Utah). The bill was a general revision of the patent law.
130 See House Hearings,supra note 1.
131 Congressman Robert W. Kastenmeier is a Democrat from Wisconsin.
132 H.R. 4732, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), reprinted in 24 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPY-
RIGHT J. (BNA) 375 (Aug. 12, 1982).
133 H.R. 6635, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), reprinted in 24 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPY-
RIGHT J. (BNA) 376 (Aug. 12, 1982).
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between an inventor and his employer. 134 The bill, modeled after the
West German Patent Law, 35 divided inventions into service inven-
tions-inventions related to the employer's business, and free inven-
tions-all other inventions.1 3 6
The bill would have required an inventor to offer any service
invention to his employer. The employer, upon accepting the inven-
tion, would have had to compensate the inventor for his portion of
the invention's fair market value. This value would have been based
on the value of a license to use the invention, the employer's actual
savings or profit from using the invention, and the price the em-
ployer would have paid another to create the invention.13 7
The Moss Bill died in committee, possibly because it was such a
radical revision of the existing law.138 Several objections to the Moss
Bill were advanced.13 9 While most of the objections are easily dis-
missed, one, that the proper recipient and appropriate compensation
would be difficult to determine, fatally faults the Moss Bill. Al-
though the bill sought to establish an arbitration board to settle dis-
putes over an inventor's compensation, the system would have relied
on private settlements to avoid being overburdened. In addition, the
Moss Bill did not provide real guidelines to establish an invention's
value and the inventor's share of that value.
2. The Hart-Owens Bill
In the next Congress, Senator Hart and Congressman Owens
introduced a bill (the Hart-Owens Bill) that would have invalidated
any provision in an employment contract that required an inventor
to assign a patent or patent application to his employer for less than
two percent of the "profit or savings." 14 The Hart-Owens Bill,
therefore, only established minimum compensation-an employer
could agree to give the inventor a higher percentage. Apparently,
134 H.R. 15512, supra note 127.
135 See Gullette, supra note 18, at 739; Orkin, supra note 2, at 658.
136 H.R. 15512, supra note 127.
137 Id. See also Sutton & Williams, supra note 2, at 563.
138 See Gullette, supra note 18, at 740.
139 The major objections to the Moss Bill were 1) it rewards inventors rather than pro-
motes the progress of the useful arts as the Constitution requires; 2) it interferes with the
freedom of contract; 3) it increases the costs of doing business; 4) the existing laws are ade-
quate; and 5) the proper recipient and appropriate compensation are difficult to determine.
See Sutton & Williams, supra note 2, at 568-83. Sutton and Williams favored the enactment
of the Moss bill.
140 S. 1321 and H.R. 7111,supra note 129. Orkin points out that most employed inventors
receive less than the the minimum two percent, so the bill would have generally improved the
inventor's compensation. Orkin, supra note 2, at 661.
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the bill would not have eliminated the common law methods for an
employer to obtain the invention.14 1 Thus, the Hart-Owens Bill
would not even have guaranteed the two percent unless the invention
fell outside the employment-status and fiduciary-duty tests.
Unlike the Moss Bill, the Hart-Owens Bill did not propose an
arbitration system-the inventor and his employer were expected to
negotiate the percentage. The bill did seek to give the Patent Com-
missioner the authority to establish procedures to implement the sys-
tem, but the inventor's basic remedy would have been to sue his
employer. The bill, therefore, would have only slightly modified the
existing distribution of rights while substantially raising the inven-
tor's compensation.
The Hart-Owens Bill would have established a workable, self-
patrolling system. Unfortunately, like the Moss Bill, the Hart-Owens
Bill died in committee. 142
3. The Kastenmeier Bills
In the Ninety-Seventh Congress, Congressman Kastenmeier in-
troduced two bills to protect the employed inventor. 143. The first
bill144 sought to prohibit an employer from exacting a pre-invention
patent assignment agreement from an inventor unless the invention
is an "employment invention." The bill defined an employment in-
vention as one made by an employee during his term of employment.
An employment invention also had to be based on the inventor's nor-
mal or assigned duties, inside technical information acquired from
his employer, or a fiduciary relationship.145 Additionally, an employ-
ment invention had to relate to the employer's actual or contem-
plated business.146 The bill also would have totally eliminated
patent trailer clauses. 147 Moreover, it would have limited an em-
ployer's shop right to instances where the inventor made substantial
141 S. 1321 and H.R. 7111, supra note 129. Orkin suggests the bills are so poorly worded
that the employer would be able to to stop royalty payments after the inventor's employment
terminates, or the inventor would be able to regain the entire patent rights if the employer
fails to pay the minimum two percent royalty. Orkin, supra note 2, at 661.
142 See Hearings, sutira note 1.
143 H.R. 4732, supra note 132, and H.R. 6635, supra note 133.
144 H.R. 4732, supra note 132. This bill is modeled on the Moss bill and existing German
law. See Hearings, supra note 1.
145 H.R. 4732, supra note 132, § 402.
146 Id.
147 Id. § 403(b). This seems to ignore the problems of trade secrets discussed in notes 98-
107 supra and accompanying text.
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use of his employer's time, material, facilities, or funds.'48
Kastenmeier's second bill 149 proposed a mandatory compensa-
tion system for employed inventors. First, the bill divided employee's
inventions into service inventions and free inventions. Service inven-
tions are made during the period of employment and have either
''grown out of the type of work performed by the employee" or are
"derived from experiences gained on the job."'150 All other inven-
tions are free inventions in which the inventor retains all the patent
rights.15' An employer could release a service invention either by
failing to diligently prosecute the patent application or by releasing
the invention in writing. 52 Alternatively, an employer could claim a
service invention, but had to adequately compensate the inventor.
53
If an inventor and his employer could not agree, an arbitration
board would determine the inventor's compensation. 154 The bill also
sought to protect the inventor by prohibiting an employer from dis-
criminating against an inventor who filed a complaint before the ar-
bitration board. 55
These proposed federal statutes are all pro-inventor. They also
share a common problem-the government would ultimately deter-
mine the inventor's compensation. This would create a myriad of
bureaucratic problems, such as protracted appeals, lengthy delays,
and difficult enforcement. The statutes also would require an em-
ployer to project the inventor's compensation at an early date---even
before the employer begins production. The inventor, on the other
hand, risks his employer's retaliation in seeking an undetermined
compensation. 156 The administrative remedies provided in these bills
148 Id. § 403. This does away with the trivial use problem described in notes 65-70 supra
and accompanying text.
149 H.R. 6635, supra note 133.
150 Id. § 402(3). This ambiguous language would attract lawsuits. The concepts could be
better stated as: resulting from a) duties the employer has specifically assigned the inventor
or b) the employer's trade secrets. (This formula, however, requires the inventor to assign a
much narrower range of inventions than the language in the current bill.)
151 Id. § 402(4).
152 Id. § 413.
153 Id. § 412.
154 Id. § 414(b). The Patent Commissioner was to appoint a three member arbitration
board. Id. § 435. The bill determines the invention's value using its fair market value dis-
counted to reflect the inventor's position and the employer's contribution. Id. § 414(a).
155 Id. § 438.
156 Before he confronts his employer, an inventor must determine that the potential
award of the invention's share outweighs the problems of confronting his employer. The
inventor may have only vague notions of his invention's value because he lacks the ability to
conduct marketability tests. His employer, on the other hand, may desire to conduct exten-
sive studies before marketing the invention.
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can only sink the government deeper into the regulatory quagmire.
III. A New Proposal
The state statutes are necessary because they protect the inven-
tor by reducing his employer's ability to obtain a patent unrelated to
the inventor's work. These statutes, however, do not solve the more
fundamental problem of stimulating progress in the useful arts by
giving an inventor a stake in his invention. The proposed federal
statutes also fail to create a definite stake because an inventor must
confront his employer to receive an undetermined compensation. A
better solution would provide a clearly-defined boundary between an
inventor's and his employer's rights.
As one possible alternative, Congressl 57 could create a "reverse
shop right" which would require the inventor to retain a royalty-free,
non-exclusive, singly-transferable t58 license to use any patent as-
signed to his employer. This reverse shop right would make the in-
ventor more valuable because he could sub-license his invention to a
new employer upon changing jobs. The license's value would be an
element of the inventor's new salary. Thus, employers would bid on
a valuable inventor not only for his future achievements but also for
his past accomplishments. Determining compensation, therefore,
would presumably be easier. The reverse shop right would also avoid
the administrative burden of the proposed federal statutes because
salary negotiations rather than an arbitration board would deter-
mine the inventor's compensation.
An employer faces many uncertainties in developing an inven-
tion. Presently, he can eliminate one uncertainty by paying his re-
search staff a salary independent of any invention's value. The Moss,
Hart-Owens, and Kastenmeier bills prohibited this practice, thus im-
posing two additional uncertainties-the invention's value and the
inventor's share. The reverse shop right adds only one uncertainty-
how much money it will take to keep the inventor from finding other
employment. Additionally, the risk of the inventor changing em-
ployers might only arise if the invention is valuable. Employers may
be more willing to face this risk than the two uncertainties involved
in the proposed bills. Inventors would certainly favor the reverse
157 The author hopes that the reader is convinced of the need for a national solution.
Congressional action will avoid the the possible problems raised in note 13 supra.
158 "Singly-transferable" means that the inventor can only license one employer at a time.
Thus, if he had multiple employers, an inventor could only license one employer under his
reverse shop right. But, if the inventor switched jobs, he could transfer the reverse shop right
to his new employer.
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shop right to the complicated administrative process provided by the
other legislative proposals.
Precedent exists for a court to find a reverse shop right. In Main-
land Industries, Inc. v. Timberland Machine & Engineering Corp. 1-59 the Or-
egon Court of Appeals left open the possibility of a reverse shop right
although it refused to create one under the particular circum-
stances. 60 While acknowledging the concept's novelty, the court saw
the clear analogy to the shop right doctrine. Another pioneer court
has already held that an employee has a right to use trade secrets
which he created for his former employer.' 6 ' Courts, however, may
be reluctant to expand the employee's traditional right to use skills
and knowledge learned through employment, 62 by following Main-
land Industries and actually finding a reverse shop right. Congress,
therefore, should remove all doubt by amending the patent laws to
create a reverse shop right.
IV. Conclusion
The current common law methods for distributing patent rights
between an inventor and his employer do not maximize inventive-
ness because an employer can obtain an inventor's patent rights
before the inventor has even created his invention. Courts should
critically examine pre-invention patent assignments and void, as
against public policy, unconscionable and anticompetitive
agreements.
A few states have improved the inventor's situation by enacting
statutes preventing an employer's overreaching. In addition, various
congressmen have introduced bills to amend the patent laws to give
the inventor a stake in his invention. Congress, however, has not re-
sponded to the need for a national standard. Nevertheless, congres-
sional action is needed not only to alleviate the problems of the
employed inventor but also to standardize the law.
159 58 Or. App. 585, 649 P.2d 613 (1982).
160 The court reasoned that the inventor did not have an equitable right to a shop right
because not only was he paid to invent but he also tried to hide the invention from his em-
ployer. 649 P.2d at 618. Miller, Mainland's employee, created the invention in 1976 but did
not reveal it to his employer-he even reported that there was no solution to the problem.
Later, two months before the patent was issued, Miller retired and formed Timberland.
Timberland raised the reverse shop right issue as a defense to infringment. 649 P.2d at 618.
161 Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 160 A.2d 430 (1960). Wexler has generally not been
followed. See, e.g., Basic Chems., Inc. v. Benson, 251 N.W.2d 220 (Iowa 1977).
162 Reid v. Mass Co., Inc., 155 Cal. App. 2d 293, 318 P.2d 54 (1957); National Rejectors,
Inc. v. Trieman, 409 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1966)(en bane); Welex Jet Servs., Inc. v. Owen, 325
S.W.2d 856 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
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An unwillingness to impose a regulatory framework onto the
employment relationship has stymied federal reform. A self-execut-
ing scheme, therefore, must be found which will allow the parties to
work out an invention's value without government interference.
One solution may be to create a reverse shop right in the inven-
tor. An inventor would receive a royalty-free, non-exclusive, and sin-
gly-transferable license to use any patent which he assigns to his
employer. This right would enable the inventor to bargain for a
higher salary based on his invention's value.
The American inventor must receive adequate compensation for
creating unique solutions to our daily problems or he will not con-
tinue to look for these solutions. While an employer should also re-
ceive adequate compensation for his efforts in researching and
developing the infant invention, the law must protect an inventor
from his employer's possible overreaching. America's inventive fire is
flickering-whether it dies out or continues td burn brightly depends
on whether the patent law adequately rewards both the inventor and
his employer.
William P. Hovell
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